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Abstract—Due to the advancement of IoT devices in both
domestic and industrial environments, the need to incorporate
a mechanism to build accountability in the IoT ecosystem is
paramount. In the last few years, various initiatives have been
started in this direction addressing many socio-technical concerns
and challenges to build an accountable system. The solution that
has received a lot of attention in both industry and academia
is the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD) specification. It
gives the possibility to the IoT device manufacturers to describe
communications needed by each device to work properly. MUD
implementation is challenging not only due to the diversity of
IoT devices and manufacturer/operator/regulators but also due
to the incremental integration of MUD-based flow control in
the already existing Internet infrastructure. To provide a better
understanding of these challenges, in this work, we explore and
investigate the prototypes of three implementations proposed by
different research teams and organisations, useful for the commu-
nity to understand which are the various features implemented
by the existing technologies. By considering that there exist some
behaviours which can be only defined by local policy, we propose
a MUD capable network integrating our User Policy Server
(UPS). The UPS provides network administrators and end-
users an opportunity to interact with MUD components through
a user-friendly interface. Hence, we present a comprehensive
survey of the challenges and future directions of MUD enabled
environments.
Index Terms—IoT, IoT Traffic Regulation, Accountability,
Traffic Filtering, Anomaly Detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the advancement and adoption of smart IoT systems
in recent years, billions of sensors and actuator devices from
thousands of vendors are connected to the Internet. The data
generated from these devices generally have spatial and tem-
poral dimensions, which have more contextual value to their
local users than remote users. However, in many use-cases,
the collective data generated by distributed sensors/actuators
bring value to their remote users. Furthermore, the standard
Internet protocols and Infrastructures are used to meet the
remote access and connectivity requirements. The Internet
connectivity not only speeds up the process of advancing
new global and remote services, but also make these devices
more vulnerable to new security, data, and privacy attacks
similar to traditional internet-connected machines. Therefore,
to minimise possible threats, IoT deployments need to address
various security requirements: authentication, confidentiality,
integrity, non-repudiation and availability.
Nevertheless, due to resource constraints and heterogeneity
of current IoT devices, deployment of full-fledged security
solutions is not possible. Therefore, smart and distributed
solutions are needed. One potential solution is to restrict the
traffic communication pattern for these devices so that the
attack surface is reduced. In order to simplify things and to
bring progress in this direction, manufacturers of IoT devices
should take responsibility and authority to provide legibility
of the traffic generating from their IoT devices, and end-users,
who are also network managers in domestic settings, should
have user-friendly tools to analyse, detect and control over
their IoT devices.
Giving manufacturers the responsibility to provide a de-
tailed description of the behaviours of the device, has been
investigated [1] and an initiative to formalise specifications by
IETF (RFC 8520) [2]. In our work, we present a summary of
the current work in this direction and identify many research
questions and challenges that need future investigation. Fur-
thermore, we present our solutions to address some of these
challenges by focussing on the deployment of manufacturer-
provided MUD along with user-defined policies for COTS
devices.
Contributions: In this paper, we analyse state-of-the-art
MUD deployment scenarios and discuss challenges and short-
coming with each approach. We present the User Policy
Server (UPS), which provides to network administrators and
end-users the opportunity to interact with MUD components
through a user-friendly interface. However, the proof-of-
concept provided presents new challenges that are analysed
throughout this paper. Hence, we present a list of future work
which we think is a contribution to the research community
who are working in this direction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II,
we describe an overview of the MUD workflow in a home
environment and explain how MUD can isolate the IoT
devices from potential external and internal security attacks
and provide short descriptions of three MUD deployments.
In Section III, we present current open challenges and their
security impacts from our knowledge gained by reviewing the
three MUD deployments. In Section, IV, V and V-A, we list
some of the security challenges which could be solved by our
solutions and then present our solutions and evaluations in the
respective Sections. The related work in this direction so far
and future work we discuss in Section VI and VII respectively.
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II. MUD OVERVIEW
According to IETF (RFC 8520) [2], a MUD deployment
should consist of three architectural building blocks: (1) The
Manufacturer User Description (MUD) file, that is created by
the device manufacturer to describe the device and its expected
network behaviour. (2) A uniform resource locator (URL), that
is used to retrieve the MUD file from a manufacturer’s server
when a device is added to a home or a small business network.
(3) A mechanism for local network management systems to
retrieve the description. The workflow between these com-
ponents is shown in Fig 1. In 1©, when a device added in
the network, it sends MUD-URL with a X.509 certificate or
DHCP or LLDP (depending on the implementation). In 2©,
the local router (As Network Access Device (NAD)) sends the
MUD-URL to AAA server for authentication of the request. In
3©, AAA server sends the authenticated MUD-URL to MUD
manager. The MUD Manager, in case of X.509 authentication,
validate the signature and request ( 4©) and retrieve MUD file
from the manufacturer’s file server ( 5©). The MUD file is a
YANG-based JSON file (IETF RFC 7951) [3] signed with a
public key signature from the device manufacturer. The MUD
manager validates and processes the MUD file and store file
locally for until its certificate is valid and generate Access
Control Lists (ACL). In 6©, the MUD manager sends ACL
to NAD. The NAD enforces ACL rules it received from the
MUD manager to all the traffic passing through it.
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Figure 1: MUD Workflow.
From the workflow and the MUD specification, we can con-
clude that MUD specification has provided enough flexibility
and scope to choose different implementations to incorporate
requirements of various deployment scenarios. In our work, we
focus on investigating three different implementations of MUD
deployments: Cisco proof-the-concept (PoC) implementation,
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [4],
[5] implementation based on Software Defined Network and
OpenSource MUD [6] developed by a consortium of compa-
nies (Cable Labs, Cisco, CTIA, Digicert, ForeScout, Global
Cyber Alliance, Patton, and Symantec) in device manufac-
turing and network security, coordinated by a cybersecurity
firm, MasterPeace Solutions. We present a comparison of these
implementations in the Table I and provide brief descriptions
in this section.
A. Cisco MUD PoC
Cisco proposed (shown in Figure 2) an open-source proof-
of-concept (PoC) intended to help engineers and users to
familiarise with the MUD standard. Therefore, the implemen-
tation does not include all the mechanisms typical of MUD
environments. Some MUD manager automation is not imple-
mented, and some protocol characteristics are not supported
[7].
As illustrated in Figure 2, they provide a single device
serving as MUD manager and a FreeRADIUS server (as a
AAA Server) that interfaces with the Catalyst 3850-S switch
over TCP/IP. The DHCP server hosted by the Catalyst 3850-S
switch is configured to be MUD enabled, i.e. extract MUD
URLs from IPv4 DHCP packets. The deployment provided
leverages DHCP and LLDP as MUD URL emission methods.
The Cisco MUD Manager interacts with a FreeRADIUS server
to authenticate the MUD URL received from the routers, and
uses MongoDB to store policy information. Furthermore, its
configuration shows the aim of this PoC, i.e. introducing MUD
standards to manufacturer and end-users.
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Figure 2: Logical Architecture of Cisco MUD implementa-
tion.
Along with the standard MUD implementation, Cisco initial
architecture also proposed two additional components, Threat
Signalling Server and Update Server. The requirements for
DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) is described in IETF
RFC 8612 [8].
B. NIST MUD
The NIST implementation [4] relies on the Software De-
fined Networking concept, i.e. data plane and control plane
disjunction, and OpenFlow SDN switches. In this deploy-
ment, the rules are organised in more than one flow tables
by the OpenFlow switch. The SDN controllers manage the
rules injection and update in two ways relying on particular
times: dynamically, when a packet arrives at the controller,
or proactively when the switch connects to the controller.
Ranganathan et al. [5] presented an implementation focusing
on achieving rules scalability at SDN switch, by using SDN
flow rules in three flow tables. The first two flow tables classify
source and destination MAC addresses. In comparison, the
third table implements the MUD policy by introducing rules
defined in terms of packet classification metadata assigned in
the first two tables. After generating the pipeline described,
the packet is finally sent to a table that implements L2Switch
flow rules which is provided by another application. The latter
forces the implementation to not use general Network ACEs.
InternetSDN Switch
GATEWAY
SDN Controller
MUD Policy Engine
(SDN-MUD)
Packet-In
Event
Figure 3: NIST-MUD Architecture.
C. Open Source MUD
Open Source MUD (osMUD) [6] is an open-source im-
plementation [9] developed by a consortium of device manu-
facturing and network security companies. By comparing the
architecture shown in Fig. 4 with those analysed in previous
paragraphs, it is noticeable that the MUD manager directly
runs on routers. Thus, only routers that have some character-
istics are suitable for this deployment. OsMUD is designed
easily build, deploy, and run on Open Wireless Router (Open-
WRT) platform, which limits the router choice to only those
compliant with this platform. Furthermore, the implementation
integrates dnsmasq that extracts from the DHCP packets the
MUD-URL, provides network infrastructure services, and is
designed to be suitable for resource-constrained routers and
firewalls.
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Figure 4: osMUD Architecture.
III. FINDINGS: LIMITATIONS AND SECURITY ISSUES
In this section, we discuss the limitations and security issues
of the three prototypes described in the previous section.
We investigated these implementations by setting a test en-
vironment in our lab. We understand these implementations
are proofs-of-concept and are not fully implemented versions.
Still, we thought this is a good starting point to understand the
pros and cons of each implementation, which motivates further
work in this context. Furthermore, this is the first existing
analysis in this direction, which explores the challenges that
must be considered during the building of a MUD capable
network.
A. Cisco MUD
As a proof-of-concept, the main limitations of this deploy-
ment regard the MUD Manager configuration. In fact, before
the beginning of the MUD Manager, the configuration of DNS
resolution service is manually performed by a human operator,
which implies to restart the MUD manager process if new
settings have been made. The static configuration introduces
scalability problems, due to the manual configuration of DNS
resolution, and availability problems, because the MUD man-
ager needs to be restarted to pick the new settings made. Thus,
Cisco deployment is impractical in real environments.
Another static limit, which regards the implementation
itself, involves ACLs management. In particular, all rules,
including ingress traffic, i.e. traffic received from external
sources to the network and directed to local IoT devices, are
static. Consequently, even MUD compliant IoT devices are
still vulnerable to attacks originating from external domains,
also though the device’s MUD file makes it clear that the
device is not authorised to receive traffic from that domain.
Nevertheless, dynamic rules, including egress traffic, i.e. traffic
sent from IoT devices to an external domain, are supported [7].
Thus, an attacker is not able to establish a TCP connection
with the device from an outside domain.
B. NIST MUD
The SDN based PoC provided by Ranganathan et al. [5]
presents some issues on packet processing. By following the
tables pipeline (section II-B), the first rule in MAC address
(first tables) classifications stage, which is installed when
the switch connects, could allow the packet sending to the
controller but not to the next table. Thus, a packet may not
proceed in the tables pipeline before it can be classified, which
implies performance consequences, i.e. switch failure because
no packets from a newly connected device can go through
the first table until the rule being installed. The behaviour de-
scribed may be necessary if strict ACLs are required. However,
Ranganathan et al. [5] proposed a “relaxed” mode to manage
these situations by loosening the ACE definition. In this mode
packets can proceed in the pipeline while classification flow
rules are being installed, which can result in the violation of
the MUD ACEs with the condition that the system will become
eventually compliant to the MUD ACEs. These packets could
Table I: Comparison of MUD implementations
Implementation Support URL via DHCP URL via LLDP URL via x509 URL via another ways Component of an AAA system Sig Verification
Cisco-MUD PoC - Cisco Catalyst 3850 Yes (no DHCPv6) Yes No No Yes OpenSSL
NIST-MUD OpenVSwitch Yes No No with MAC + MUD No No
osMUD Run on openwrt dnsmasq No No No No OpenSSL
get through before the classification rule being installed at the
switch.
C. Open Source MUD
The limits emerging from this implementation regards the
deployment requirements. To host the MUD manager, only
OpenWRT compliant routers using a particular version of
dnsmasq can be employed in this deployment. A valuable
solution provided by osMUD developers to run the MUD
Manager outside OpenWRT is to compile it in C environments.
However, it induces new requirements: it requires to use
a compatible firewall and a DHCP server that can extract
the MUD-URL from the DHCP header packet for MUD
Enabled Devices. Thus, OpenWRT remains the most user-
friendly alternative, as a result of availability for the majority
of general-purpose routers [10] and making the MUD manager
deployment easier.
Lastly, the current implementation does not have MUD file
rules for lateral movement; thus, attackers can progressively
move through a network, searching for targeted key data and
assets.
IV. SECURITY CHALLENGES
In this section, we summarise the potential security im-
plications of the three MUD implementations. None of the
implementations uses X.509 option to emit the MUD URL
and provides support through DHCP or LLDP. Therefore,
if a device is compromised, the MUD URL issued through
it can potentially be spoofed. Conversely, it is secure when
the device uses the X.509 extension since the MUD URL
is added to the certificate by the manufacturer. This means
that the MUD URL emitted by an X.509 device can not be
spoofed without detection, even if the device is exploited.
Further security issues are related to the MUD Specification
itself. It does not provide any inherent security protections
to IoT devices themselves. If a device’s MUD file permits
an IoT device to receive communications from a malicious
domain, traffic from that domain can be used to attack the
IoT device. Similarly, if the MUD file permits an IoT device
to send communications to other domains, and if the IoT
device is compromised, it can be used to attack those other
domains. Some security considerations to keep in mind by
users implementing MUD are provided by the specification [2]
in the Security Consideration section. However, we list some
additional security challenges which need further addressing:
(1) How to prevent a IoT device from a compromised IoT
device’s local attack in the local environment. (2) When
MUD signing certificate gets expires while MUD file is still
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Figure 5: Our setup: osMUD with remote MUD file server
and local User Policy Server.
deployed and in function locally; MUD Manager should fetch
a newly signed file with signature and updates rules without
interrupting the IoT device availability and functionality. (3)
MUD enforced rules does not provide sufficient fine-grained
control. Individual users may have their deployment setup with
may require additional rules; thus a mechanism to incorporate
the user policy to filter traffic to provide more fine-grained
control is needed. (4) How to incorporate updates from Threat
Signalling Server. The further question and investigation in this
direction is - should they go through MUD file or through a
generalised common server updates (and filters) for all IoT
devices.
V. USER POLICY SERVER IN A MUD ENABLED NETWORK
In this Section, we present and analyze our solution of prob-
lem three listed in the previous Section, which we consider
of relative importance. The deployment showed in Figure 5,
which was used in our testbed, has these main components: (1)
OpenWRT router running osMUD Manager (2) Manufacturer
MUD file server running remotely and (3) our User Policy
Server (UPS) running locally on a local server. The User Pol-
icy Server is a web server based on express framework whose
architecture is similar to the Manufacturer MUD File Server
(MFS). Deploying this entity gives to an administrator/end-
user of an internal network the opportunity to store new
MUD Files (hereafter called UPS Files) containing rules more
suitable for the network in which MUD is deployed. Thus, a
network administrator is now able to interact with all the MUD
components using a user-friendly interface.
It should be noted that by using the same YANG com-
pliant JSON files and MFS interaction, the UPS does not
imply relevant changes on the overall osMUD architecture.
In particular, the osMUD implementation is extended by us
in order to incorporate the following workflow (Figure 5): (1)
MUD Manager retrieves the MUD file from the manufacturer
MUD file server; (2) MUD Manager verify and parse files and
generate ACL and insert ACL on Netgear router; (3) MUD
Manager asks to the UPS if there is another UPS file for
the device; (4) if yes, MUD Manager retrieves the file, verify
and parse files and generate ACL and insert ACL on Netgear
router.
The previous steps imply that router hosting osMUD has
UPS’s certificate and that osMUD implementation can request
a further UPS file. We assume that the MUD Manager knows a
priori the UPS location. To locate UPS files and make the com-
munication trusted, the device’s mac-address is used as UPS
file name(e.g. <device-mac-address>.json) and each UPS file
is signed by the UPS (as MFS case). After obtaining the
UPS file, the MUD Manager can now process it and produce
the rules to enforce in the router firewall. At the end of this
procedure, the union of manufacturer and administrator rules
is performed. This behaviour is appropriate to define either
internal communication pattern or more relaxed rules. For
example, in voice-based assistant systems (e.g., GoogleHome)
case, it is hard for the manufacturer to define a communication
pattern that allows all communications that it needs. Thus, the
administrator can quickly build new communication patterns
for the necessary services.
Nevertheless, the rules union could bring out new chal-
lenges: redundancy (limited storage) and conflicting rules
(packet filtering performance [11]). The former can be easily
managed by using a matching technique, e.g. rule to insert with
IP tables rules. The latter induces a vital problem that needs
to be solved. For example, suppose that the manufacturer’s
rules (MUD file) allow the communication with two different
external hosts, say, A and B, but administrator rules (UPS
file) allow only A and C. In our current system, the device
for which these rules are defined is allowed to communicate
with all three hosts (A, B and C). If a priority system is
used and administrator rules have the highest priority, the
previous device is able to communicate with only A and C.
Both problems are beyond the aim of this work, but they will
be considered for future UPS versions. Hence, considering
the ability to remove/reversing MUD rules, using UPS needs
thoughtful consideration.
The UPS introduction in a MUD enabled the network to
pave the way to new exciting scenarios:
• Automatic UPS File generation: Use a tool that auto-
matically generates UPS files (YANG compliant JSON
files) by monitoring the internal traffic [12].
• New MUD File structure for UPS Files: Extension of
current file structure to obtain more restrictive rules such
as packet rate, maximum packets, time restrictions, max-
imum ingress and egress points. To implement this, we
require extending osMUD Manager, parsing capabilities,
and rule enforcement logic.
• Publish/subscribe architecture: it is possible to ex-
tend the UPS infrastructure with a publish/subscribe
model [13], where server becomes the publisher and
the router becomes subscriber, in order real time rules
upgrade. The server can publish, by understanding the
traffic behaviour, new rules that must be inserted in the
IP tables of the router. The described architecture requires
signature based authentication between the router and
server, otherwise an attacker could impersonate the server
and insert less restrictive rules.
A. Evaluations
The system evaluations aim to check the feasibility of
running such a system in home routers or small business
environments. We run experiments in our lab environment
on an OpenWRT compliant Netgear router (model WNDR
3700v2) and an entity that hosts the UPS (MacBook Pro, Intel
Core i5 and 8 GB of RAM). To check the system feasibility,
the tests are performed by considering the total time spent
(latency) by the osMUD Manager in:
• retrieving the MUD file;
• verifying and storing the file locally at the router;
• processing the file and installing the rules.
These actions depict the setting time of the rules specified in
a MUD file.
The tests consider router in its booting stage that represents
the highest overloading phase, because of the aggregation
of DHCP requests received from all connected devices (IoT
and non-IoT). In case of MUD compliant IoT devices, the
osMUD manager processes the MUD-URLs one by one to
locate the MUD files. Hence, the file retrieving and processing
is sequential. Additionally, to study the worst-case scenario,
our tests examine the situation where all the IoT devices are
turned on before the router boot process so that all the MUD
files need to be retrieved at the same time. For testing purpose,
the MUD file server provided by osMUD designers 1 is used.
The osMUD manager, when a MUD compliant IoT device
has administrator rules (UPS file), has to repeat the same
operations listed above after installing the MUD file rules.
It is worth noting that these UPS files are not defined for all
the MUD compliant device, but only for devices for which is
considered appropriate by an administrator (in our test it is
simulated with a random number).
The Fig. 6 illustrates the performance of the osMUD man-
ager in classical (without UPS files) and administrator (with
UPS files) environment. Both the tests have been repeated 20
times with a file size range between 2-6K. In the test settings,
the UPS file requests and MUD file requests are set as: (1,1),
(2,2), (2,4), (3,8), (6,16). The numbers in the brackets (a,b)
indicate: a = number of MUD compliant devices (random),
which request for UPS file; b = number of MUD compliant
devices.
1https://mudfiles.nist.getyikes.com/
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Figure 6: Access Control List (ACL) Rule setting time with
osMUD and osMUD with UPS.
First of all, by considering only the one device scenario,
the performance registered by the osMUD manager in the
presence of UPS file is slightly worse than those achieved by
the classical MUD environment, as a result of an additional
request done to the UPS. Nevertheless, the results obtained
are better than expected; the latency average in osMUD with
the UPS file is 4.1 seconds compared with 2.9 seconds of
osMUD in classical cases, which means in average only 1
second worse. One of the reasons that bring out this result
comes from the evidence that requests do not leave the local
network, which implies a reduction in the file download time.
These results are promising and motivate the usage of a User
Policy Server in a MUD deployment.
Secondly, in the ideal environment, the time spent on doing
these operations is not linear, as a result of not stable con-
nectivity. However, the time is not exponential, so the number
of devices do not carry excessive weight on the performance.
This is not true for the administrator environment, in which
the time depends on the number of devices requires additional
requests. For example, the couple (6,16) reached a spike of 55
seconds, compared with 45 seconds of the ideal environment.
In conclusion, in both cases with 16 devices, the time
exceeds more than twice the time spent by 8 devices. The
evaluation leads us to think that when the number of devices
is over a certain threshold, the router starts to slow its
performance, for example, in the case illustrated in Fig. 6
the threshold value can be defined as 8 devices, as a result
of the considerable growth reached after this number. The
circumstance described represents the worst condition that
could occur in case of router failure or unexpected reboot of
it. In a steady condition in which at most 2 devices at a time
are added, the performance registered are acceptable in both
the environment even if both the devices requests an additional
UPS file.
VI. RELATED WORK
The use of MUD as an isolation-based defensive mechanism
to restrict traffic generated from the IoT devices is still in
its early phase. Therefore, only a few deployment scenarios
and proof-of-concept (PoC) implementations currently exist.
Andalibi et al. [14] proposed extended MUD functionality
to include traffic patterns - such as message size, peak-rate
and maximum message transmissions within a time-period
and proposed to implement those filtering at the fog network
firewall. However, the paper does not provide any implemen-
tation. Also, it does not provide further details related to how
these traffic control lists will be enforced at the fog networks
and how this solution will be scalable in a large organization.
Yadav et al. [15] have proposed the scenario of combining user
control policies with MUD to provide fine-grained control of
IoT data. This work lacks to provide how to use user-based
policies with MUD to control messages directly exchanged
with external services. Ranganathan et al. [5] presented a
scalable implementation of the MUD standard on OpenFlow-
enabled Software Defined Networking switches and Hamza et
al. [16], [17] developed machine learning methods to detect
volumetric attacks such as DoS, reflective TCP/UDP/ICMP
flooding, and ARP spoofing to IoT devices in MUD compliant
traffic. Feraudo et al. [13] presented and evaluated Federated
Learning in the MUD compliant Edge Network and showed
a use-case of User Policy Server (UPS). Gracia et al. [18]
presented a proactive security approach managing secured
and automated deployment of IoT devices by using an SDN-
enabled security architecture in Industrial IoT settings. Matheu
et al. [19] presented an extended MUD model with a flexible
policy language to express additional aspects, such as data
privacy, channel protection, and resource authorization. Afek
et al. [20] presented a system built upon the MUD specification
to provide IoT security through a VNF deployed within the
ISP.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
The MUD specification presents some limits from security
and architecture perspectives. There exist some behaviours
which can be only defined by local policy, even when using
components that are fully MUD compliant. If the default
policy provided by the manufacturer is not sufficient or too
restrictive for the network standard, user actions are necessary
to configure the device according to a different and desired
policy. Thus, our work explores the existing MUD implemen-
tations and tries to find the most convenient deployment for
the general user. Furthermore, our work implements the UPS
web server that provides a user-friendly interface needed to
interact with the MUD components to modify their default
settings when required. The behaviour defined allows building
whitelist rules more suitable for the network in which MUD
is deployed.
Our future directions will be focused on the extension of the
User Policy Server functionalities and on solving implemen-
tation inconsistencies concerns, to guarantee a higher level of
security. The work we presented in this paper provides useful
insight, and we hope the research and development community
get benefit from this. Furthermore, this work opens up more
discussions before we start adopting these solutions in real
deployment scenarios.
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